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Abstract—Amazon EC2 provides two most popular pricing
schemes–i) the costly on-demand instance where the job is
guaranteed to be completed, and ii) the cheap spot instance
where a job may be interrupted. We consider a user can select
a combination of on-demand and spot instances to finish a task.
Thus he needs to find the optimal bidding price for the spot-
instance, and the portion of the job to be run on the on-demand
instance. We formulate the problem as an optimization problem
and seek to find the optimal solution. We consider three bidding
strategies: one-time requests with expected guarantee and one-
time requests with penalty for incomplete job and violating the
deadline, and persistent requests. Even without a penalty on
incomplete jobs, the optimization problem turns out to be non-
convex. Nevertheless, we show that the portion of the job to be
run on the on-demand instance is at most half. If the job has
a higher execution time or smaller deadline, the bidding price
is higher and vice versa. Additionally, the user never selects the
on-demand instance if the execution time is smaller than the
deadline.
The numerical results illustrate the sensitivity of the effective
portfolio to several of the parameters involved in the model.
Our empirical analysis on the Amazon EC2 data shows that
our strategies can be employed on the real instances, where the
expected total cost of the proposed scheme decreases over 45%
compared to the baseline strategy.
Index Terms—Cloud pricing, spot instance, on-demand in-
stance, optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
CLOUD computing is projected to increase to $162 bil-lion in 2020. The latest quarterly results released from
Amazon shows that Amazon Web Services (AWS) realized
43% year-to-year growth, making contribution to 10% of con-
solidated revenue and 89% of consolidated operating income
[1]. However, the success story of the CSPs inherently de-
pends on the user’s participation. The cloud service provider’s
(CSP’s) prices affect the users’ behavior and the profit of the
CSP. CSPs provide different pricing plans to meet customers’
service requirements which we describe in the following.
A. Cloud Pricing Schemes
The most popular pricing schemes broadly adopted are:
usage-based pricing, auction-based pricing, and volume-
discount pricing [2]. Among the above, the most popular ones
are the usage based and the auction-based pricing. In the
usage-based pricing, which is also known as pay-as-you-go,
asks a fixed price per instance per hour and remains constant
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(static) over a long time. This type of pricing scheme is
commonly implemented in Amazon [3], Google [4], Windows
Azure [5], etc. For example, Amazon EC2 on-demand instance
provides fixed price short term service with no up-front
payment or long-term commitment. The user will certainly
get the resource on on-demand instance [3].
On the contrary, in the auction-based pricing (e.g., Amazon
EC2 spot pricing), users bid for the service, and the CSP sets
a dynamic threshold to decide the successful bids based on
the demand and bids. In each time slot, the bids that are
above the spot price (which is decided by the CSP) will be
accepted, and others will be rejected. The users pay the spot
price1. Although a user can bid a relatively lower price for the
spot instance compared to the price it has to pay for the on-
demand instance, the job may be interrupted when the bid is
below a threshold [3]. Typical job types like word counting,
multimedia processing, etc. can be run using auction-based
pricing strategies.
There are two types of spot instance requests: one-time
requests and persistent requests. Specifically, the user bids
with the instance type, bid price, etc., and the instance will
start when the bid is higher than the spot price. When the
user’s bid price is lower than the spot price, the job will be
interrupted and action taken afterwards relies on the request
type: the interrupted job will be resumed when the bid price is
above the spot price again if it is a persistent request and will
be terminated permanently otherwise (i.e., if it is a one-time
request). Figure 1 depicts this procedure.
Fig. 1: Spot Instance Requests [6]
B. Research Challenges and Contributions
The user will be likely to distribute its job over on-demand
and spot instances. This is because in the on-demand instance,
the user will be able to complete the job. In the spot market,
the job may be interrupted. However, the user can pay less.
1Hence, it has the similarity with the generalized second price auction.
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2Most of the existing literature considers the profit maximizing
spot pricing from the CSP’s perspective [7]–[11]. It is also
imperative to investigate the optimal decision of the users. The
users needs to select a price to maximize in the spot-instance.
The user also needs to select the portion to be run on the
on-demand instance. In this paper, we propose a method that
enables the users to decide how to make decisions in order to
minimize the expected cost while completing the job within
the deadline.
The closest work to ours is [12], which is motivated by
Amazon EC2’s auction-based spot pricing, they modeled the
CSP’s spot price setting and derive user’s optimal bidding
strategies. However, in the cloud infrastructure, more and
more cloud jobs are requested for data analysis, such as
web logs analysis, weather forecast analysis, finance analysis,
scientific simulation, etc. Most of them have hard deadlines,
which can be predefined by the companies, or application
providers. Failing to do meet the deadline, it may incur a
penalty [13]. For example, weather prediction is carried out by
exploiting complex mathematical models based on the histor-
ical data such as temperature, atmospheric pressure, humidity,
etc. The Environmental Modeling Center runs the Global
Forecast System model for 16 days into the future [14]. If
the computing job misses the deadline, some extreme weather
may not be predicted in time, awareness and preparedness
for the severe weather will be missed, resulting in large loss
of human life, social welfare, and financial resources if the
severe weather happens. [12] did not consider the deadline or
the penalty incurred when a job misses the deadline. However,
the deadline and penalty considered above impacts the bidding
prices.
We consider that the users can access both the on-demand
instances and the spot instances. On-demand instances exploit
the pay-as-you-go pricing scheme which guarantees the avail-
ability of the instances and there is no interruption of the job.
Unlike on-demand instance, the spot instance uses the auction-
based pricing scheme. The user bids for the spot instances, but
its job will be interrupted when its bid is below the current
spot price [7]. Thus, there is no guarantee that a job can be
finished before its deadline if a user selects the spot instance.
However, the user is likely to pay less for the spot instance. We
consider that a job can be split into independent chunks, which
can be processed on different machines in a parallel manner.
We have seen many similar workloads in the real world, for
example, word counting, multimedia processing, etc. [2], [15],
[16].
A user possessing the jobs, which can be run parallelly, may
want to know whether a combination of on-demand and spot
instances can be used to minimize the total cost while finishing
the job before deadline. The user now has to select the portion
of job to be completed via the on-demand instance and the
spot instance. Additionally, the user has to select the bidding
price for the participation in the spot instance 2. We propose an
economic portfolio model for computing the optimal behaviors
when it comes to how to allocate the job with known fixed
deadlines to on-demand and spot instances and how much to
bid for the spot instance 3.
We suppose that each job has a fixed deadline, and a fixed
execution time, which is the total time required to complete
the job without any interruption. For example, suppose a job
requires 30 minutes to finish. If it starts and gets interrupted
after 10 minutes, we still need 20 minutes to execute the
job. We consider two request mechanisms: one-time requests
and persistent requests. Recall that with a one-time request,
if a user’s job is interrupted, it will not be resumed on
the spot instance. Thus, the user’s job may not be finished
before the deadline by placing one-time requests. We consider
two bidding strategies in one-time requests. The first one
considers the user wants to finish its job before the deadline
in an expected sense, and we denote this strategy as one-time
requests with expected guarantee (OTR-EG) (Section III-A).
However, it may not pay a penalty if it is incomplete or misses
the deadline. Subsequently, we consider a strategy, where a
user pays a penalty if the job is incomplete or misses the
deadline, and we denote this strategy as one-time requests
with penalty (OTR-P) (Section III-B). Finally, we consider the
bidding strategy by placing persistent requests, and denote it as
persistent request (PR) (Section III-C), where the interrupted
job can be resumed when the bid price is higher than the spot
price again.
Our analysis shows that, in terms of one-time requests,
when the deadline is smaller than the execution time, the user
should select the on-demand instances. The optimal bidding
price in OTR-EG will decrease first and then increase with
the deadline, while the optimal bidding price in OTR-P will
increase with the deadline. We also show the optimal bidding
prices on spot instance in OTR-P increase with the increase of
the penalty coefficients, and very small or very large penalty
coefficient for incomplete jobs will lead to a slower increase
of bidding price. However, when the deadline is larger than
the execution time, the user will solely depend on spot instance
to finish the job, and the optimal bidding prices for OTR-EG
and OTR-P do not change with the increase of the deadline.
We, subsequently, consider the case where a user places
a persistent request for the spot instance. In the persistent
request, unlike the one-time request, an interrupted job will
be resumed when the bid price exceeds the spot price again.
A lower bid can reduce the cost of executing the job on
2Though we consider the cloud computing market, our model can be applied
to other markets. For example, in the Display Advertising market of Internet,
the spots are allocated in a two-stage process. In the first market, the publisher
(e.g., Google’s DoubleClick, OpenX, and Yahoo!’s Right Media) promises to
deliver a contracted number of impressions within a fixed time slots (over a
day); the second market (spot market) runs an auction to allocate the displays
in every time frame (in an hour), where the advertisers arrive and bid for the
displays [17]. The spot market is operated if an advertiser requires certain
spots in the current time frame. Thus, the advertiser has to select how much
to bid in the spot market, and how much to buy fixed impressions in the first
market.
3Our approach can be applied in a MapReduce setting. Suppose we fix the
number of instances M to run for each job apriori. We need to split each job
into two sub-jobs, and decide whether to run on spot or on-demand instance.
Each sub-job will be run on M instances.
3the spot instance, while the number of interruptions may be
increased, so dose the total idle time, total recovery time
and total completion time, which may exceed the deadline.
Thus, it is not apriori clear that how much portion of the
job should be run on the spot-instance, and what the bidding
price will be if we want to finish the job before the deadline
in expectation. Our result shows that the persistent request
reduces the expected cost of the user as compared to the one-
time-requests. Similar to the one-time-request, only when the
deadline is smaller than the execution time, the user selects
the on-demand instances. Note that we did not consider any
penalty based approach in the persistent request. This is mainly
because in the persistent request, the interrupted job is not
discarded and thus, it will finish unlike the one-time request.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows:
• User’s optimal or local optimal bidding strategies: For
the one-time request and persistent request job, we formulate
the cost minimization problem as an optimization problem.
The problem turns out to be non-convex. Nevertheless, we
find analytical expression for the optimal solutions for the
one-time request without penalty and the persistent request.
However, for the one-time request with penalty, we provide
algorithms for solving the proposed non-convex problem.
• Analytical Results: Our analytical result shows that only
when the deadline is smaller than the execution time, the
user should select the on-demand instances. We show a
threshold type behavior for one-time request. When the
penalty is above a certain threshold, the user opts for the on-
demand instances. However, below the threshold, the portion
of the job that is run on the on-demand instance becomes
independent of the penalty parameters. Our result shows that
the persistent requests reduce the expected cost of the user
compared to the one-time-request.
• Numerical Evaluation: We, empirically, evaluate the im-
pact of different parameters on the portion of the job should
be run on the spot instances, and the bidding price. Our
result shows that the expected cost, and the portion of the
job that is run on the on-demand instance decreases with the
increase in the deadline. The bidding price in the persistent
request instance decreases with the increase in the deadline.
However, the bidding price in the one-time request increases
with the increase in the deadline in the one-time request.
• Real time Data: Using the real time data, we show the
strength of our approach compared to the baseline strategies
readily employed by the users. Specifically, we compute
the optimal bidding strategy in the spot-instance, and the
optimal portion of the job should be run on the on-demand
instance. Finally, we show that the user’s cost is reduced
using our approach compared to the baseline ones.
C. Related Literature
The genre of works can be divided based on the topics they
considered.
Portfolio Contract: This type of portfolio contract has
been practiced and studied in many other contexts especially
in procurement, e.g., Hewlett-Packard (HP) uses a portfolio
approach for procurement of electricity or memory products
[18]. Motivated by that practice, the procurement has been
studied in multi-period [19] and single-period [20] settings.
However, the above portfolio contracts did not study the cloud
spot market, the deadline, and the execution time.
Deadline-based cloud scheduling: Deadline-based re-
source allocation has been considered in many cloud research
works. While resource allocation approaches are utilized in
the cloud context, which aims to meet the jobs’ deadlines and
utilize the cloud resource more efficiently [21] or minimize
the total execution cost [22], [23], they only consider from
the CSP’s perspective. In this paper, we develop a model
to optimize the bidding strategies of the user. Although in
[12], optimal one-time request and persistent request bidding
strategies are proposed, they do not consider the deadline of
the user’s job, which may be not practical [21]. In this paper,
we not only consider one-time request without penalty and
persistent request bidding strategies, we also include one-time
request with penalty model to balance the finished job and
penalty for the unfinished job or late completed job. This
model can be applied to the type of the job with a soft
deadline, which is a deadline when it is unmet, dose not lead
to computation useless [24], [25].
Game Theory, Auctions and Bidding: Game Theory has
been used to model the interactions between CSPs and users
to reach an equilibrium [26]–[29]. In distributed resource
allocation games, auctions have been proposed to be a solution
[30], [31], including to ensure truthful bidding in Amazon spot
pricing [32].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the system model. In Section III, we present three
types of bidding strategies: one-time request without penalty
(Section III-A) and with penalty (Section III-B), and persistent
request (Section III-C). In Section IV, extensive simulation
results show the benefits of each strategy. We test our proposed
model and results using Amazon spot price history in Section
V. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper. We relegate all
the proofs in Appendix.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a CSP, which can provide two types of com-
puting instances: on-demand instance and spot instances. On-
demand instance can guarantee the availability, but the price
is fixed and high. In order to provide a reduced-cost service,
the CSP also offers spot instance, which may terminate un-
predictably since the price fluctuates based on availability and
demand, and update spot price in every certain time period,
e.g., every 5 minutes. The users can run its job on the spot
instance as long as the bid price exceeds the spot price.
We consider a user can select a combination of on-demand
and spot instance to finish a task. In other words, the user
decides the portion of the job to be run on the on-demand
instance and the rest in the spot instance. The spot price is
much lower than the on-demand price for every instance type
[3]. However, the spot market cannot guarantee that the task
is run continuously if her bidding price is not high enough,
which means the task may be interrupted and takes extra time
4to get recovered, so that the task may take longer time to get
finished. Therefore, the user should balance the proportion of
the job she runs on on-demand instance, with the bidding price
in an spot market to run the rest of the job on spot instance.
This paper aims to provide a framework to help users to decide
how much to run at on-demand instances and how much to
bid for spot instances with the objective to minimize the total
cost, subject to the constraint that deadline has to be satisfied.
We consider a series of discrete time slots t ∈ {1, 2, · · · } and
denote the spot price at time slot t as pi(t). We assume the spot
prices pi(t) are i.i.d, upper-bounded by the on-demand price p¯i
for the same instance type and lower-bounded by the marginal
cost of the instance pi, which is very small and closed to 0
[10], that is, pi ≤ pi(t) ≤ p¯i. We use Fpi to denote the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of spot price pi(t), which is heavy-
tailed [12], corresponding to the probability density function
(PDF) fpi . We use p to denote the user’s bid price. Fpi(p)
gives the probability that p ≥ pi(t), that is, the user’s bid
gets accepted. We assume fpi monotonically decreases, thus
F ′′pi (p) = f ′pi(p) < 0, i.e., Fpi(p) is concave in p, which is
consistent with the observations and findings in [12].
Suppose a user has a certain job J, which can be split
and run on different machines. First, the user would like to
purchase on-demand instances to ensure a certain desired level
of finished job in the future; say, q portion of the total amount
of task run on on-demand instance. And the rest portion of
the job (1 − q) will be run on spot instances. Then the user
needs to decide how much to bid (p) to the spot market. The
strategy of the user is to decide p and q. More formally, we
define the strategy of a user in the following
Definition 1. The strategy of a user is the vector x = (q, p).
A user decides (q, p) while minimizing the expected cost.
Figure 2 depicts the major considerations that we need to
incorporate in the bidding and resource allocation decisions
graphically.
Spot Instance (𝜋)
On-demand Instance (ത𝜋)
User Cloud Service Provider
Random spot price 𝜋
q
p, 1-q
Fig. 2: User Decision Model
We consider three bidding strategies: OTR-EG, OTR-P, and
PR, where the first two strategies can be used if the user places
a one-time requests, and the third strategy will play a role
when the persistent requests are placed. The problem is to
design optimal portfolio of contracts and bidding strategies in
different settings, so that the expected total cost is minimized,
subject to the deadline constraints. We use x∗ = (q∗, p∗) to
denote user’s optimal decisions. Then we will investigate the
extent of the benefits that can be accrued by managing a
portfolio of contracts instead of sticking to on-demand instance
contract.
Our notations are summarized in Table I. We not only
consider the job’s characteristics such as its execution time
te, total completion time T , the recovery time for writing and
transferring the data saved after interruption tr , but also include
the deadlines ts on the job completion times.
TABLE I: Key terms and symbols
Symbol Definition
p User bid price
q The portion of job that will run on on-demand instance
pi Spot price
p¯i On-demand price
pi Minimum spot price
tk Length of one time slot
T Total job completion time
ts Deadline of the job
te Job execution time (w/o interruptions)
tr Recovery time from an interruption
cI Penalty coefficient for incomplete job
cs Penalty coefficient for late completed job
III. USER BIDDING STRATEGIES
In this section, we first consider OTR-EG, subsequently,
OTR-P, and finally, PR for a single instance on each machine
type.
A. OTR-EG
In one-time request, a job on spot instance will not be
resumed as soon as the job is interrupted, the user’s objective
is to minimize the total cost. However, the job has to be
completed before the deadline. In order to make sure that there
exists at least one feasible solution such that the job can be
finished before deadline, we assume that te ≤ 2ts . The factor
2 comes from the fact that the smallest time a job can be
completed when the half of the job is run on the on-demand
instance, and the rest in the spot instance. Thus, for a feasible
solution, 0.5te ≤ ts .
First, we compute the expected amount of time that a job
will continue running without any interruptions if the user bids
p. Note that when a user bids the price p, its bid will only
be accepted if the spot price pi is lower than p. Thus, the
probability that the bid will be accepted at an instance with
probability 1 − Fpi(p). Thus, we have the following
Lemma 1. [12] The expected amount of time that a job will
continue running without any interruptions is:
tu(p) = tk
∞∑
i=1
iFpi(p)i−1(1 − Fpi(p)) = tk1 − Fpi(p) (1)
In order to guarantee that the job that runs on spot instance
can be finished, that is, the expected amount of time that a job
will keep running must exceed its execution time, we need the
following constraint:
(1 − q)te ≤ tk1 − Fpi(p) . (2)
Now, we compute the expected time tn for a job to enter
the system when the user bids p. Note that a job can only
5enter the system if the spot price is lower than the bid price.
The random variable that the bid gets into the system follows
a Geometric distribution. Thus we get the following term:
tn = tk
∞∑
i=1
i(1 − Fpi(p))iFpi(p) = tk( 1Fpi(p) − 1) (3)
From (3), we notice that tn monotonically decreases with p.
Thus we would intuitively expect that in order to finish the job
(1− q)te before deadline, the user should bid more to shorten
the expected amount of time to enter the system tn.
In order to finish the job that run on spot instance, the
deadline need to be longer than the summation of the expected
time to enter the system and the required execution time
(1 − q)te, that is,
tn + (1 − q)te ≤ ts . (4)
Lemma 2. [12] The expected price that a user must pay
to use an instance in each time slot on spot instance, or the
expected value of all possible spot prices that are no more
than p is
E(pi |pi ≤ p) =
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx
Fpi(p) (5)
Lemma 3. E(pi |pi ≤ p) monotonically increases with p and
not larger than p¯i+pi2 .
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix A. 
If the user’s bid price is p, the user has to pay for the
spot instance is the expected spot price E(pi |pi ≤ p). The user
puts (1 − q) fraction of the job on the spot market. Thus the
user’s expected cost for running the job on the spot instance
is (1− q)teE(pi |pi ≤ p). Recall that on the on-demand instance,
a user has to pay the price p¯i. The user’s cost for running q
fraction of the job on the on-demand instance is qte p¯i. Thus
the total expected cost of running the job is
qte p¯i + (1 − q)teE(pi |pi ≤ p).
The user also has to make sure that its job is completed
before the deadline. In other words, the expected time the job
will take to finish must be smaller than the deadline ts . The
total time a job takes in the on-demand instance is qte and in
the spot-instance is given by tn+ (1−q)te. Thus, the total time
to complete the job is max{qte, tn+ (1−q)te}. Hence, the user
is solving the following problem:
(P1) min Φ1(p, q) = qte p¯i +
(1 − q)te
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx
Fpi(p)
(6)
subject to (2), (4)
qte ≤ ts (7)
pi ≤ p ≤ p¯i (8)
0 ≤ q ≤ 1 (9)
The objective function (6) aims to minimize the expected
total cost running on on-demand and spot instance. In order to
guarantee that the job can be completed before deadline, we
include constraints (7) and (4), which represent that the both
of maximum job completion time on each instance including
the job execution time and time to enter the system (if any)
should not exceed the deadline. The constraint in (8) denotes
the upper and lower bound of the bidding price in the spot
instance.
Claim 1. When ts < te ≤ 2ts , q∗ ≤ 12 ≤ tste and Fpi(p∗) ≥ 12 .
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix B. 
The above theorem shows that q∗ is at most half. Thus,
at most half of the job is put on the on-demand instance.
Intuitively, on-demand price is larger than spot price, if the
user wants to minimize his total cost, he will run as much
job as possible on spot instance. However, if the deadline is
smaller than the execution time, the user may have to opt for
on-demand instance as the user has to complete the job before
the deadline. The above claim shows that the fraction of the
job that will be run on on-demand instance never exceeds half.
The results show that the bidding price in the spot market has
to be at least the median of the distribution.
Proposition 1. When te2 < ts < te, the optimal bid price for
a one-time request is
p∗ = max{ψ−11 (tk p¯i), ψ−12 (0)}, (10)
where ψ−11 (.) is the inverse function of
ψ1(p) =
2tk
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx
Fpi(p) +2ptsFpi(p)−pts−(ts+tk)
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx
(11)
and ψ−12 (.) is the inverse function of
ψ2(p) = (ts + tk)Fpi(p) − (ts + tk)Fpi(p)2 − tk (12)
with Fpi(p) ≥ 12 . Further the optimal portion of the job to run
on on-demand instance is
q∗ = 1 −
ts − tk( 1Fpi (p∗) − 1)
te
. (13)
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix C. 
Proposition 1 implies that the portion of job that runs on the
on-demand instance q∗ decreases as the deadline ts increases.
Intuitively, as the deadline increases, a user can be more
likely to run the job in the spot instance as the job can be
more likely to be finished using spot instances instead of the
on-demand instance resulting into a lower cost. The above
proposition also shows that the optimal bidding price p∗ takes
the maximum value of two functions. The intuition is that with
certain portion of job running on spot instance, lower price can
decrease the total cost, however, in order to guarantee that the
spot instance can continue running without any interruption,
the price cannot get too low.
Note that though the optimization problem is non-convex,
we still obtain the optimal strategy. q∗ is non-zero, however it
is less than half.
6Proposition 2. When ts > te, the optimal bid price for a one-
time request is
p∗ = F−1pi (1 −
tk
te
). (14)
Further, the optimal portion of the job to run on on-demand
instance is
q∗ = 0. (15)
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix D. 
We can observe from Proposition 2 that when ts > te, all of
the job will be run on spot instance, and the optimal bid price
p∗ does not depend on the deadline ts , but instead increases as
the number of time slots that are needed to complete the job,
te/tk increase. This increase in the bid price with the te/tk is
intuitive because more consecutive time slots are required to
complete the job, and thus, a higher bid is needed.
B. OTR-P
In section III-A, we consider that if the job is interrupted,
it can not continue. However, there are some possibilities
that the job will not get completed before deadline or get
interrupted before completion. In this section, we consider the
scenario where a user has to incur a penalty when the job is
not completed before the deadline. Note that in the one-time
request there can be two possible ways the job may not be
completed before the deadline: i) The job is incomplete, and
ii) The job is late. We now define each of them.
Definition 2. Incomplete Job: the job is interrupted before its
completion.
Definition 3. Late Job: the job is completed (i.e. it is never
interrupted), however the total time it takes is greater than the
deadline. For example, when the time to enter the system is
long, the job may get completed beyond the deadline.
In section III-A, we put a constraint where we consider the
expected time for completing the job is less than the deadline.
However, as the spot price is random, the job that we run
on the spot instance may not be completed (as it is one-
time request) or may be completed after the deadline. In this
section, we compute the optimal solution where we put penalty
for the job which is incomplete or late.
If the job is not completed (i.e., the case (i) holds), there is
a penalty cI associated with the unfinished portion of the job4.
If the job is not interrupted, however, it is completed after the
deadline, there is another penalty cs for the portion of the job
that is completed after the deadline. We also assume cs ≤ cI ,
which means the completed job will have a lower penalty than
that of incomplete one. We denote the total number of slots
needed to complete the job in the spot instance is K(q) =
(1−q)te
tk
.
The user wants to minimize the expected cost which also
consists of the expected penalty for incomplete jobs. We begin
by finding the expected total penalty and then formulate the
4If the job is not complete, one may need on-demand instances or incur
penalty for the unfinished job.
optimization problem before deriving the user’s optimal bid
price. We now compute the expressions.
Definition 4. Let L(p, q) be the expected time by which a
completed job is late, i.e., L(p, q) = (tc − ts)+ where tc is the
time to complete the job when the user’s strategy is (p, q).
Lemma 4.
L(p, q) = tk(1 − Fpi(p))
ts
tk
−K(q)+1Fpi(p)K(q)−2 (16)
Recall that Fpi(p) represents the probability that p ≥ pi, that
is, the request starts to run or continues running (we denote
it as “success”); and 1 − Fpi(p) is the probability that the
request fails or get terminated (we label it as “failure”). The
intuition behind Lemma 4 is from when the user places the
bid, a Bernoulli trial is “conducted” in each time slot. In order
to guarantee the portion of job (1 − q)te can get completed
on spot instance, a fixed number K(q) = (1−q)tetk statistically
independent Bernoulli trials’ results need to be“success” suc-
cessively, which happens with probability Fpi(p)K(q)−1. On the
other hand, the random variable that the bid gets the first
“success” follows a Geometric distribution. For example, when
the bid dose not win until the Mth time slots, the probability is
(1− Fpi(p))M−1Fpi(p). When the number of time slots that the
bid spends without getting accepted is larger than tstk −K(q), the
job may be completed but late. Considering all the possibilities
of the late but completed job, we have the expression in
Lemma 4.
Definition 5. Let EC(p, q) be the portion of the job that is
completed on the spot instance.
Lemma 5. The expected portion of the job that can be
completed when the user bids the price p
EC(p, q) = 1 − Fpi(p)
K(q)
1 − Fpi(p) tk
(17)
The intuition behind Lemma 5 is in the Bernoulli process,
the expected completed job is from the first “success” to the
job interruption (the first “failure” from the first “success”) or
the job completion.
Definition 6. Let EI(p, q) be the portion of the job that is
incomplete in the spot instance when the user bids the price
p.
EI(p, q) is simply the difference between the total portion
of job running on spot instance and the expected portion of
job that can be completed with bid price p on spot instance,
thus we can obtain
Lemma 6.
EI(p, q) = (1 − q)te − EC = (1 − q)te − 1 − Fpi(p)
K(q)
1 − Fpi(p) tk
(18)
Considering the penalty for incomplete job and completed
but late job, the user solves the following optimization prob-
lem:
7(P2) min U = qte p¯i +
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx
Fpi(p) EC(p, q)
+ cIEI(p, q) + csL(p, q)
(19)
subject to (7), (8), (9)
(1 − q)te ≤ ts (20)
Solution Method: Note that if cI , cs are large, q and the
price should increase in order to avoid hefty penalty. Although
the constraints in (P2) are linear, the objective function is non-
convex. Thus problem (P2) is non-convex. Unlike the problem
in the OTR-EG, we cannot have any closed form for (P2). We
use the successive convex approximation based algorithm [33],
which iteratively solves approximate convex relaxation of the
problem. The algorithm is stated in Algorithm 1. Let U˜ as the
approximation of the objective function U, which is the first
order approximation of U, that is,
U˜(x; y) =
2∑
i=1
(∇xiU(y)T (xi − y(i)) +
τ
2
(xi − yi)2). (21)
Instead of solving U, we solve U˜ iteratively, which is shown
in Algorithm 1. When the difference between two successive
objective values is smaller than  = 10−5, the iteration stops.
Algorithm 1 Successive Convex Approximation Algorithm to
solve (P2)
Input: ν = 0, k = 0, γ ∈ (0, 1],  > 0, x0 = (q0, p0) such that
x0 is the solution of OTR-EG.
Output: xˆ(xν)
1: while obj(k) - obj(k-1) ≥  do
2: // solve for xν+1 with given xν .
3: Step 1: Compute xˆ(xν), the solution of xˆ(xν) =
argminU˜(x, xν), s.t. (7), (8), (9), and (20), solved using
CVX.
4: Step 2: xν+1 = xν + γν(xˆ(xν) − xˆν).
5: //update index
6: Step 3: ν ← ν + 1.
7: end while
C. PR
In section III-A and III-B, we consider the one-time request
job. We now consider a job that places a persistent spot in-
stance request, where the job can be interrupted and recovered
upon resuming when the bid price is above the spot price.
We, first, compute the total time T for completing a job
in the PR in spot instance. The expected running time is
TFpi(p) with bidding price p, and the associated expected
idle time is (1 − Fpi(p))T . The expected number of idle-to-
running transitions in T/tk time slots is Ttk Fpi(p)(1 − Fpi(p)).
We incur a recovery time every time there is a transition
from the ideal state to the running state. Thus, TFpi(p) =
( Ttk Fpi(p)(1−Fpi(p)))tr+(1−q)te, we get TFpi(p) =
(1−q)te
1− trtk (1−Fpi (p))
[12].
Lemma 7. The total time including the recovery, execution
and idle time is
T =
(1 − q)te
1 − trtk (1 − Fpi(p))
1
Fpi(p) (22)
Note that as Fpi(p) increases the time decreases.
(P3) min Φ3(p, q) = qte p¯i + (1 − q)te1 − trtk (1 − Fpi(p))
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx
Fpi(p)
(23)
subject to (7), (8), (9)
(1 − q)te
1 − trtk (1 − Fpi(p))
1
Fpi(p) ≤ ts (24)
tr <
tk
2(1 − Fpi(p)) (25)
The expected total time including the recovery, execution
and idle time should be smaller than the deadline, so we
get constraint (24). The constraint in (25) guarantees that the
recovery time is sufficiently small such that the job’s running
time is finite [12].
Claim 2. In PR, when te2 < ts < te, Fpi(p∗) ≥ 12 .
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix E. 
The above claim shows that in the spot instance a user’s bid
should exceed the median value of the distribution.
Proposition 3. When te2 < ts ≤ te, the optimal bid price for
a PR is
p∗ = p¯i (26)
Further, the optimal portion of the job to run on on-demand
instance is
q∗ = 1 − ts
te
(27)
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix F. 
The above proposition entails that when te2 < ts ≤ te, the
user bids the highest possible value in the spot instance. The
user also runs a portion of the job in the on-demand instance.
The portion of the job that is run on the on-demand instance
is given by
q∗ = 1 − ts
te
.
If te is large, q∗ is higher. Proposition 3 thus implies that
surprisingly, the bidding price does not change as the deadline
changes, and the optimal portion of the job that run on on-
demand instance is decreasing with the deadline. The bidding
price at the spot instance is the maximum possible bidding
price. This is intuitive, because when te is large, the bid price
has to be large.
Proposition 4. When ts > te, the optimal bid price for a PR
is
p∗ = ψ−13 (
te
ts
). (28)
where ψ−13 (.) is the inverse function of
8ψ3(p) = Fpi(p)[1 − trtk (1 − Fpi(p))]
The optimal portion of the job to run on on-demand instance
is
q∗ = 0 (29)
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix G. 
This shows that similar to the one-time request, the portion
of the job that is run on the on-demand instance is 0 when
ts > te. Thus, a job will be run on the on-demand only when
ts ≤ te. Also note that ψ3(·) is an increasing function. Hence,
as the ratio
te
ts
increases the bidding price also increases.
Lemma 8. When ts < te ≤ 2ts , the difference of optimal
portions of job to run on on-demand instance with OTR-EG
and PR is bounded by tkte .
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix H. 
IV. NUMERICAL STUDIES
In this section, we present computational results that il-
lustrate the sensitivity of the expected total cost, the corre-
sponding bid price and the portion of job that run on on-
demand instance in terms of the different parameters used in
the model. We specifically focus on the impact of the deadline,
penalty coefficient, and the recovery time. Note that we use
closed-form solutions for our OTR-EG and PR, and convex
approximation algorithm for the OTR-P.
A. Distribution of Spot Price
We, first, introduce the spot price probability density func-
tion. In many applications including the cloud spot market,
the prices follow a Pareto distribution [12]. The PDF of the
spot price is chosen to be
fpi(pi) =
α( 1p¯i−pi )α
θ( 1p¯i−pi )α+1
(30)
which behaves like a Pareto Distribution, the random vari-
able pi is bounded by pi and p¯i.
B. Simulation Set Up
In this section, we consider a job that needs one hour ( i.e.,
te = 1h = 3600s) , the deadline ts is 2000s, the length of
one time slot is 5 minutes (i.e., tk = 5min = 300s), and the
recovery time tr = 10s. We assume that the PDF of the price
in spot instances is drawn from the distribution shown in (30).
We set α = 3 and θ = 0.983. The on-demand price p¯i is 0.35
and the provider’s marginal cost of running a spot instance pi
is 0.0321.
We use the above parameters to do the numerical evaluations
and illustrate the tradeoff of different bidding strategies by
comparing the bidding prices, portion of job that runs on on-
demand instance, expected total cost and percentage of late
job.
Recall that x∗ = (q∗, p∗) is the user’s optimal decisions.
We use closed-form solutions for our OTR-EG and PR, and
convex approximation algorithm for the OTR-P for incomplete
job and violating the deadline. we generate the random spot
price pit for each time slot according to the distribution of spot
price we introduced, a one-hour count-down program will be
run for each bidding strategy based on the associated optimal
solution x∗ = (q∗, p∗), that is, q∗ portion of the job will be
run on on-demand instance, and the rest will be run on spot
instance with bidding price p∗. Note that after the job starts
running, if the random spot price pit is higher than the bid
price p∗, the job with one-time request will get interrupted
and not resumed. However, the job with PR will get resumed,
where a recovery time will be added, when the random spot
price pit is lower than its bid price p∗ again.
When we consider the expected total cost, to be consistent
and get insight, besides running cost, penalty for incomplete
job and violating the deadline will be added for the strategies
OTR-EG and OTR-P; penalty for violating the deadline will
be added for PR. We run the simulation for 1000 times, and an
average is taken to get the expected total cost for each bidding
strategy.
C. Comparison among different request mechanisms
In this subsection, we compare the cost, bidding price in
different scenarios for a fixed te = 3600s. We vary the deadline
ts , from 1850s to 8000s in the steps of 50s.
From Fig. 3(a), we can see that as the deadline increases, the
bidding price in OTR-EG decreases first, and then increases.
From Proposition 1 (cf. (10)) we can see that the optimal bid
price is determined by the minimum of two terms: the first
term (cf. (11)) is to get the trade-off between the bid price
and portion of job running on on-demand instance, and the
second term is to guarantee that the job can continue running
without interruption, and finish before the deadline (cf. (12)).
Thus, the bid price decreases for a while since lower price
can lead to lower total cost while the job will not get any
interruption. After that we see the bid price increases with
the deadline. The reason is that with a longer deadline, the
portion of job that runs on spot instance becomes bigger (see
Fig. 3(b)). In order to guarantee that the job running on spot
instance can continue running without any interruption, the bid
price should be higher.
Fig. 3(a) also shows that when the deadline ts is smaller
than the execution time te, the user needs to bid with the
upperbound of the spot price p¯i for PR, and bid lowest for
OTR-EG compared to PR and OTR-P. Note that with PR, if a
job is interrupted, there will be a recovery time tr before it get
resumed. The user not only needs to pay for it, he also needs
to allocate more tr amount of job to on-demand instance in
order to finish the job. That is to say, although we do not put
any penalty on our PR model, (pi + p¯i)tr will be added to the
total cost for each interruption, which is even larger than the
cost to run tr on on-demand instance, i.e., p¯itr . Thus the users
needs to bid the upper-bound of the spot price. In terms of
OTR-P, the user needs to find a trade-off between the penalty
and bid price, thus the bid price is higher than that of OTR-EG
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Fig. 3: Impact of Deadline with te = 3600s, cI = p¯i/3, cs = p¯i/10, and tr = 10s
but lower than that of PR. When the deadline ts is larger than
the execution time te, the user’s optimal strategy is to rely on
spot instance: there will be no job running on the on-demand
instance (see Figure 3b) and the optimal bid price will not be
impacted by the increase of deadline (cf. (14)).
Another interesting observation from Fig. 3(a) is that the
bidding price is higher in PR for smaller deadline. It decreases
and gets lower than that of OTR-EG and OTR-P when the
deadline is longer than the execution time. This is because
unlike one-time request, in PR, the interrupted job can get
resumed in the spot instances and a recovery time will be
included, which will induce more cost when the execution
time is shorter than the deadline. However, when the execution
time is longer than the deadline, with the increase of deadline,
smaller bidding price can save the cost while guaranteeing the
job can be completed before the deadline.
Figure 3b shows that, as we would expect from Lemma
8, when the deadline is smaller than the execution time, the
differences among the portions of job that runs on on-demand
instance by using OTR-EG and PR are minimal, which is
not larger than tkte =
300
3600 ≈ 0.0833. We can also see that
the user will put the same portion of the job tste running on
the spot instance by using OTR-P and PR. The intuition is
that because spot instance price is not higher than that of on-
demand instance, the user tends to run as much job as possible
on the spot instance, which is tste .
In order to show the difference more clearly, we plot Figure
3c to show the ratio of portion of job runs on on-demand
instance compared to OTR-EG. The comparison shows that
when the execution time is smaller than the deadline, the user
put less job on on-demand instance by using OTR-P and PR
compared to OTR-EG, and the portion of the job put on on-
demand instance decreases much faster for OTR-P and PR
compared to OTR-EG.
Figure 3d shows that when the deadline ts is shorter than
the execution time te, the expected total costs obtained with
different strategies are decreasing. This is intuitive, as the
deadline increases, the portions of the job will be run on on-
demand instance, whose price is not less than that of spot
instance, are getting smaller (which can be verified in Figure
3b), thus the expected total costs are becoming lower.
However, when the deadline ts is longer than the execution
time te, the user’s optimal strategy is to rely only on spot
instance to finish the job and there will be no job running
on on-demand instance (see Figure 3b, Proposition 2 and
Proposition 4). Note that the bidding price obtained from PR
decreases with the deadline and gets smaller than the bid
prices in OTR-EG and OTR-P, which are not impacted by
the increase of the deadline (see Figure 3a). Therefore, the
expected total costs obtained from PR is decreasing while that
of OTR-EG and OTR-P do not change. Another interesting
observation is that the expected total cost of PR is lower than
that of the other two bidding strategies, indicating that users
can further lower the total running cost by using PR.
In Figure 3e, we plot the percentage of jobs that are delayed
to after the deadline for OTR-EG and OTR-P. We can see that
with OTR-EG, the percentage of late jobs are decreasing with
the increase of deadline and there are always some job being
delayed after deadline. However, for OTR-P, almost all the
jobs can be finished before deadline. Thus, adding penalty
can reduce the fraction of jobs which are delayed.
D. OTR-P: Impact of the Penalty Parameters cs , and cI
Recall that the penalty corresponding to the incomplete job
in the spot instance is cI and the penalty corresponding to the
portion of the job completed after the deadline is cs . We, now,
evaluate the impact of cI and cs on the bidding prices and the
expected total cost (including penalty).
We assume that the execution time is 3600s. We consider
three different scenarios of the deadlines: i) 2100s, ii) 2700s
and iii) 3300s.
1) Impact of penalty parameter cs: In order to see the
impact of penalty coefficient for late but completed job cs
on the bidding price and expected total cost, we fix the
execution time without any interruptions te as 3600s and
penalty coefficient for incomplete job cI as p¯i/3 , and change
cs from 0 to cI = p¯i/3 in the step of 0.005.
We observe for Figure 4 that both the bid prices and
expected total cost increase with the increase in the penalty
coefficient cs . The higher bidding price is due to the fact that
there is a penalty due to the completed but late job. However,
compared to the bid price, the expected total cost is relatively
less sensitive to the change of penalty coefficient cs (see Figure
4(b)). Finally, from Figure 4(b) we also observe that the total
cost decreases with the deadline. This is because a smaller
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portion of the job that runs on the on-demand instance when
the deadline is higher.
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Fig. 4: Impact of Penalty Coefficient cs with te = 3600s and cI =
p¯i/3
2) Impact of penalty parameter cI : In order to investigate
the impact of penalty coefficient for unfinished job cI on the
bidding price and expected total cost, we fix the execution time
without any interruptions te as 3600s and penalty coefficient
for late completed job cs as p¯i/10 , and vary cI from cs = p¯i/10
to p¯i/2 in the step of 0.005.
We note from Fig. 5(a) that the optimal bidding prices on
spot instance increase with the increase in the penalty coeffi-
cient cI . That is intuitive, since a larger penalty coefficient for
unfinished job implies that a higher penalty for the unfinished
job. Hence, the user has to bid a higher price for spot instance.
However, very small or very large cI will lead to a slower
increase of bidding price. When cI is small and below a certain
threshold T1, the bidding price does not increase much because
of the lower penalty. On the other hand, when cI exceeds a
threshold T2, the bid price becomes closer to the upper bound.
Thus, increase in cI does not increase the bid price as rapidly
as cI in between of T1 and T2. Fig. 5(a) also suggests that
with longer deadline, the bid price is higher. This is because
more portion of job will be run on spot instance with longer
deadline, then in order to avoid the penalty for incomplete job
or completed but late job, higher price needs to be set.
We notice that, in Fig. 5(b), the expected total cost is in-
creasing with the penalty coefficient cI for different deadlines.
The total cost decreases with the deadline. Intuitively, longer
deadline will introduce less portion of job running on the on-
demand instance, the price of which is much higher than the
spot price.
E. PR
In this subsection, we numerically evaluate the bidding
prices, and the expected total cost for PR. We again set te
at 3600s. We investigate the variation of the deadlines and the
recovery time on the bidding prices in the spot instances, and
the expected total cost. Figure 6 suggests that the bid price
on spot instance (Fig. 6(a)) and expected total cost (Fig. 6(b))
increases with the recovery time. Intuitively, as the recovery
time increases the more time is required to recover a job after
it is interrupted. Thus, the bidding price is higher. Hence, the
expected cost is also higher. Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b) show that
as the deadline increases, the bidding price and the expected
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Fig. 5: Impact of Penalty Coefficient cI with te = 3600s and cs =
p¯i/10
cost decreases in the PR scenario. This is consistent with
Proposition 3 which shows that bid price decreases as the
deadline increases.
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V. DATA-DRIVEN EVALUATION
To verify our models and comparing with baseline al-
gorithms, we collect three sets of data for three instance
types: r3.large, r4.16xlarge and d2.2xlarge in the US Eastern
region, whose on-demand prices are $0.1660, $4.2560 and
$1.38 respectively [34]. We collect the Amazon EC2 spot
price history for the three months from (July 9 - October
9, 2017). The empirical PDF and associated estimated PDF
of these prices are shown by the black dots and blue line
respectively in Figure 7. We observe that they approximately
follow exponential functions, which are consistent among
different instance types, though the spot prices are different.
We consider a job that needs one hour (i.e., te = 3600s)
to be executed without interruption. The one hour time pe-
riods are Oct.10, 3:00pm-4:00pm, Oct.12, 9:40am-10:40am,
and Oct.14, 1:30pm-2:30pm for r3.large, r4.16xlarge, and
d2.2xlarge, respectively. We first examine the optimal bid
prices using three different bidding strategies (OTR-EG and
with OTR-P (ts = p¯i/10 and tI = p¯i/3), and PR with recovery
time 10s and 50s ) that are derived in Section III on Amazon
EC2 spot instances. The strategies are summarized in Table II
for ts = 2000s. We consider a model where the user is price
taker, one single user’s action does not impact the distribution
of the spot price.
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We show that our approach outperforms two baseline algo-
rithms, where we use one single type of instance to finish the
job. Specifically, for smaller value of deadlines, we split the
job into two sub-jobs of equal size, and each corresponding to
one instance request. For Baseline I, each of them will be run
on one on-demand instance. For Baseline II, we consider they
only use the spot market. We adopt the strategy that has been
proposed in [12]. Since these two sub-jobs are requesting for
the same types of spot instance, the bidding prices are same
for both of them. For larger value of the deadlines, we run
the whole job solely on one on-demand instance and one spot
instance for Baseline I and Baseline II respectively.
1) Smaller Value of the Deadlines: For shorter deadline
with ts = 2000s, we determine the optimal bid prices and
optimal portion of job running on on-demand instance for
different bidding strategies (Table II) to the associated spot
instance (r3.large, r4.16xlarge and d2.2xlarge). We set the
deadline at ts = 2000s and compare our algorithm with two
baseline algorithms. We use our proposed methods to calculate
p and q. Specifically, from Table II, we observe that the price
of PR is the highest, the price for OTR-P is medium, and
the price of OTR-EG is lowest, which are consistent among
different instance types and consistent with our simulation
results in Section IV.
Fig. 8 compares the job completion time, the completed job
and total cost for different instance types with different bidding
strategies and the baseline algorithms when the deadline ts is
2000s.
Fig. 8(a) shows that the total cost running with OTR-EG is
almost equal to that of the bidding strategy OTR-P and with
PR. Thus, the penalty does not increase the cost, yet, increases
the portion of the completed jobs. Our numerical results show
that the penalty mechanism reduces the cost by almost 50%
for all instances compared to the baseline I algorithm. And
compared to other methods, the method where we put penalty
for the incomplete job and violating the deadline can achieve
the minimum cost but is able to get the job done before the
deadline (see Fig. 8(b) and Fig. 8(c)).
Fig. 8(b) shows that r3.large job is interrupted when using
OTR-EG and baseline II. In contrast, the r3.large job with
penalty and PR bidding strategies are not interrupted. How-
ever, for r4.16xlarge and d2.2xlarge instances, none of experi-
ments are interrupted. Thus, the penalty does not affect the rate
of completion of jobs. Since in the baseline I algorithm, all the
jobs are put in the on-demand instance, thus, the job is never
interrupted. Note that our penalty based approach is able to
achieve similar completion rate of the baseline algorithm I,
however, at a smaller cost.which can be verified in Fig. 8(a).
From Fig. 8(b), we observe that none of the job is inter-
rupted by using different methods for job r4.16xlarge. We
compare the job completion time of r4.16xlarge in Fig. 8(c).
The results show the job completion time by using our
algorithms is longer than that of baseline I but not beyond
the deadline (the red line), while the job completion time is
beyond the deadline by using baseline II. Recall for baseline
I, we split the job to two sub-jobs with the same sizes and
each of them will be run on on-demand instance without
any interruption, which means the job completion time is 0.5
hour. There are two reasons that the job completion times are
longer by using our proposed algorithms for job r4.16xlarge
compared to baseline I: i) more than 50% of the job is allocated
to spot instance, and ii) there may be some time to enter the
system.
2) Larger Value of the Deadlines: We now discuss our
results when ts = 4000s. When ts > 3600s, from Section
III (Proposition 2 and Proposition 4), we know that the whole
one-hour job will be run on spot instance. The optimal bid
prices are shown in Table III.
Unlike the bidding prices with smaller value of the deadlines
in Table II, Table III shows that the bidding prices with PR are
the lowest, while the bidding prices for OTR-P are the highest
in different instance types. As we also expect from Section
III’s analysis for PR, longer recovery times (50s) gives higher
bidding prices than that of shorter recovery times (10s), which
are also consistent with the findings in [12].
From Figure 9(a) we can see that compared to the other two
bidding strategies, OTR-P does not introduce more cost but can
finish all the job in time without any interruption or penalty
(see Figure 9(b) and Figure 9(c), verifying the reliability of
that bidding strategy.
Figure 9(b) shows that with OTR-EG bidding strategy, it
cannot finish more job compared to PR (e.g., r3.large), that is
because the job may be interrupted after running some time,
while the same job will be recovered from interruption with
PR bidding strategy even with lower bidding prices (see Table
III). On the other hand, there may be a delay in finishing
job in the PR. The reason behind that is the job may not be
interrupted by using OTR-EG because of the higher bidding
price, while PR job may be interrupted, which induces that the
finished job can be more by using OTR-EG compared to PR
strategy within a specific time period. Note that our proposed
strategy outperforms the baseline II, as the baseline II strategy
gives rise incomplete jobs for r3.large. Our proposed strategy
for PR as well as for OTR-EG always results in completed
jobs.
Note that the job completion time is the summation of the
time to enter the system and running time. In Figure 9(c),
we can observe that for the jobs running on r3.large and
d2.2xlarge, the completion time OTR-EG strategies is not
longer than that of OTR-P strategy, that is because the bid
price of OTR-EG is lower than that of OTR-P (see Table III),
which means the job OTR-EG has higher probability to get
interrupted, thus the running time is shorter. However, since
the time to enter the system is longer with a lower bidding
price, the job running on r4.16xlarge with OTR-EG bidding
strategy has less job completion time compared to that of OTR-
P strategy.
Another interesting result in Figure 9(c), unlike our expec-
tation (higher recovery time may induce higher completion
time and higher total cost), is that within specific deadline,
in insance d2.2xlarge, the PR with longer recovery time
completes more job compared to that with shorter recovery
time, that is because the longer recovery time yields higher
bidding price (see Table III), contributing to less interruption
and less time to complete the job.
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Fig. 7: Fitting the probability density function of Amazon spot price in the US Eastern region, the best fits are exponential
functions with equation a exp(bx). The fitted parameter values, which are with 95% confidence bounds, are (a, b) = (44350,
-285.7), (8126, -14.39), and (1571, -28.84) for Fig. 7(a), Fig. 7(b), and Fig. 7(c), respectively.
TABLE II: Optimal bid prices for a single instance with ts = 2000s
Instance
Types p¯i pi
OTR-EG OTR-P PR with tr = 10s Baseline I Baseline II
p q p q p q p q p q
r3.large $0.1660 $0.0173 $0.04258 0.444505 $0.08813 0.444444 $0.166 0.444444 $0.1660 0.5 $0.02357 0.5
r4.16xlarge $4.2560 $0.4343 $1.0666 0.4445 $1.8375 0.444444 $4.2560 0.444444 $4.2560 0.5 $0.5588 0.5
d2.2xlarge $1.38 $0.138 $0.3538 0.44461 $0.83833 0.444444 $1.38 0.444444 $1.38 0.5 $0.2 0.5
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Fig. 8: Comparison among different bidding strategies for smaller value of deadlines
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TABLE III: Optimal bid prices for a single instance with ts = 4000s
Instance
Types p¯i pi OTR-EG OTR-P PR with tr = 10s PR with tr = 50s Baseline II
r3.large $0.1660 $0.0173 $0.026 $0.090299 $0.025463 $0.025855 $0.026
r4.16xlarge $4.2560 $0.4343 $0.606983 $1.8808 $0.596374 $ 0.604158 $0.606983
d2.2xlarge $1.38 $0.138 $0.3538 $0.83833 $0.218868 $0.222752 $0.3538
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we develop optimization models to minimize
the cost by randomizing between the on-demand, and spot
instance. We also provide a mechanism to bid optimally in
the spot instance. We consider three different strategies: one-
time requests with expected guarantee, one-time requests with
penalty, and persistent requests. We characterize the optimal
portion of the job that should be run in the on-demand
instance. Our analytical result shows that a user should never
opt for on-demand instance if the execution time is smaller
than the deadline. However, when the the execution time is
larger than the deadline, the user should select the on-demand
instance with a non-zero portion of the job. Additionally, the
bid price also increases as the execution time increases. How-
ever, the portion to be run on the on-demand instance never
exceeds half for one-time request without penalty and the
persistent request scenario. Our numerical experiments shows
the trade-off between higher prices to avoid interruptions
(for one-time request without penalty), higher prices to avoid
penalty (for one-time request with penalty) and lower prices
to save money (for persistent request) on the condition that the
deadline requirement is satisfied. It also shows that the user’s
cost is the lowest in the persistent request scenario. Finally,
we use real world data to test our model and analytical results
to verify our models and shows that the user can significantly
reduces its cost both in the one-time and the persistent request
scenario.
Some cloud service providers may give a two-minute warn-
ing to the user before the instance is revoked [35]. The user can
use re-bidding strategy to avoid termination of the job. We do
not consider such scenario in this paper, however, we believe
that such analysis constitutes an interesting future direction.
In order to prevent the job from revocation, some user may
choose to run each spot request on multiple machines. How-
ever, it is not clear how many machines the user should choose
and how much to bid. Thus, it can be another interesting
research direction.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Suppose g(p) = E(pi |pi ≤ p) =
∫ p
pi
x fpi (x)dx
Fpi (p) , we take the first-
order derivative of g(p) over p and get ∂g(p)∂p = fpi (p)Fpi (p)2 (pFpi(p)−∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx). Suppose h(p) = pFpi(p)−
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx, we take
the first derivative of h(p) over p and get ∂h(p)∂p = Fpi(p) ≥ 0,
which means h(p) monotonically increases with p and the
minimum value of h(p) is hmin(p) = h(pi) = 0. Because
fpi (p)
Fpi (p)2 ≥ 0,
∂g(p)
∂p ≥ 0. Therefore, g(p) monotonically increase
with p. The maximum value of g(p) is gmax(p) = g(p¯i) =∫ p¯i
pi
x fpi (x)dx
Fpi (p¯i) ≤
pi+p¯i
2 . When pi is closed to 0, gmax(p) ≤ p¯i2 .
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF CLAIM 1
We will prove this result by contradiction. Suppose pi1 is the
expected optimal bid price and q1 > 12 is the optimal portion of
job running on on-demand instance, and the associated optimal
objective value is obj1 = q1te p¯i + (1 − q1)teE[pi |pi ≤ pi1].
Now, we show that we can achieve a lower value by
employing a strategy different to the above one. Note that
since q1 > 1/2. Thus, the value of obj1 is at least te p¯i/2.
Thus, there exists a solution q ≤ 1/2 such that qte p¯i + (1 −
q)te p¯i/2 = obj1. Now, consider the strategy q∗ = q− , and the
bidding price p = p¯i. Since p = p¯i, thus, tn = 0. Now consider
q = q1 − tste . Since te/2 < ts < te, thus, 0 < q < 1/2. The
bid price be p¯i. The above strategy satisfies all the constraints.
The objective value is thus at most obj2 = (q − )te p¯i + (1 −
q+ )te p¯i/2 which is less than obj1. Hence, we obtain a lower
value by employing a different strategy. Hence, the strategy is
not optimal.
Therefore, q∗ ≤ 12 .
Now, we show that Fpi(p) ≥ 1/2 for an optimal bidding.
From constraint (2)
(1 − q∗)te ≤ tk1 − Fpi(p∗)
⇐⇒ (1 − q∗)teFpi(p∗) ≥ (1 − q∗)te − tk
⇐⇒ tk(1 − Fpi(p∗)) + (1 − q∗)teFpi(p∗) ≥ (1 − q∗)te − tkFpi(p∗)
(31)
From constraint (4)
tk( 1Fpi(p∗) − 1) + (1 − q
∗)te ≤ ts
⇐⇒ tk(1 − Fpi(p∗)) + (1 − q∗)teFpi(p∗) ≤ tsFpi(p∗)
(32)
According to (31) and (32), we can get that
(ts + tk)Fpi(p∗) ≥ (1 − q∗)te ≥ te2 (33)
Because ts + tk ≤ te, we can get Fpi(p∗) ≥ 12 .
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
By taking the first-order derivative of Φ1(p, q) over q, we
have
∂Φ(p, q)
∂q
= te(p¯i −
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx
Fpi(p) ) ≥ 0. (34)
Therefore, Φ1(p, q) increases monotonically with q, the user
can minimize his expected total cot by choosing the smallest
possible q in the feasible set. First we consider constraints (2)
and (4), we get q∗ = max{1 − tk
te (1−Fpi (p)), 1 −
ts−tk ( 1Fpi (p∗)−1)
te
},
then we will go back to check constraints (7) and (9).
When
1 − tk
te(1 − Fpi(p)) ≤ 1 −
ts − tk( 1Fpi (p∗) − 1)
te
(35)
q∗ = 1 − ts−tk (
1
Fpi (p∗)−1)
te
.
Then we substitute q in (P1) with q∗, (P1) becomes
(P1’) min G(p) = [ts − tk( 1Fpi(p) − 1)][
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx
Fpi(p) − p¯i]
+ te p¯i
(36)
subject to ts − tk( 1Fpi(p) − 1) ≤
tk
1 − Fpi(p) (37)
1 − ts
te
+
tk
te
( 1
Fpi(p) − 1) ≤
ts
te
(38)
pi ≤ p ≤ p¯i (39)
0 ≤ 1 − ts
te
+
tk
te
( 1
Fpi(p) − 1) ≤ 1 (40)
In terms of constraint (38),
1 −
ts − tk( 1Fpi (p∗) − 1)
te
≤ ts
te
⇐⇒ tk
tk − te + 2ts ≤ Fpi(p
∗)
⇐⇒ tk
2ts − te + tk ≤
tk
tk + tk
=
1
2
≤ Fpi(p∗)
(41)
which has been proved in claim 1. Thus,
q∗ = 1 −
ts − tk( 1Fpi (p∗) − 1)
te
≤ ts
te
≤ 1.
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Also
q∗ = 1 − ts
te
+
tk
te
( 1
Fpi(p∗) − 1) ≥ 1 −
ts
te
≥ 0
because 0 ≤ Fpi(p∗) ≤ 1.
Thus constraints (38) and (40) hold when the optimization
model (P1’) takes the optimal value.
Next, we will consider objective function G(p) in (P1’).
∂G(p)
∂p
=
tk fpi(p)
Fpi(p)2 [
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx
Fpi(p) − p¯i]
+
fpi(p)[pFpi(p) −
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx]
F2pi (p)
[ts − tk( 1Fpi(p) − 1)]
=
fpi(p)
Fpi(p)2 [
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx
Fpi(p) tk − p¯itk
+ (pFpi(p) −
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx)(ts − tk( 1Fpi(p) − 1))]
(42)
Suppose g(p) =
∫ p
pi
x fpi (x)dx
Fpi (p) tk − p¯itk + (pFpi(p) −∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx)(ts − tk( 1Fpi (p) − 1))
∂g(p)
∂p
=
2tk fpi(p)
Fpi(p) (p −
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx
Fpi(p) ) + Fpi(p)(ts − tk(
1
Fpi(p) − 1))
(43)
It is clear that p ≥
∫ p
pi
x fpi (x)dx
Fpi (p) , and since Fpi(p∗) ≥ 12 ,
ts − tk( 1Fpi (p) −1) ≥ ts − tk ≥ 0,
∂g(p)
∂p ≥ 0. Thus g(p) monoton-
ically increases with p. Because limp→pi g(p) = tkpi − tk p¯i < 0,
and g(p¯i) = (p¯i −
∫ p¯i
pi
x fpi(x)dx)(ts − tk) > 0, g(p) increases
monotonically from a negative value to a positive value.
The term tk fpi (p)
Fpi (p)2 > 0 in
∂G(p)
∂p , thus
∂G(p)
∂p also increases
monotonically from a negative value to a positive value, i.e.,
G(p) first decreases and then increases with p. Thus G(p) is
minimized when ∂G(p)∂p = 0. Letting
∂G(p)
∂p = 0, we thus deduce
ψ1(p)
=
2tk
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx
Fpi(p) + 2ptsFpi(p) − pts − (ts + tk)
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx
= tk p¯i
(44)
Thus the objective function G(p) takes the optimal value at
pˆ1∗ = ψ−11 (tk p¯i)
regardless of other constraints.
Further, we will analyze constraint (37), which is equivalent
to
ψ2(p) = (ts + tk)Fpi(p) − (ts + tk)Fpi(p)2 − tk ≤ 0 (45)
Because
∂ψ2(p)
∂p
= (ts + tk) fpi(p)(1 − 2Fpi(p)) ≤ 0 (46)
ψ2(p) is monotone decreasing with p.
Also because limp:Fpi (p)→ 12 ψ2(p) ≥ 0 and ψ2(p¯i) ≤ 0, there
exists one and only one pˆ2∗ such that ψ2(pˆ2∗) = 0, so constraint
(37) ( or (55))is equivalent to
p ≥ pˆ2∗
In order to get the optimal solution for (P1’), we need to
take the maximum of pˆ1∗ and pˆ2∗, i.e., p∗ = max{pˆ1∗, pˆ2∗} =
max{ψ−11 (tk p¯i), ψ−12 (0)}.
Finally we will go back to check whether condition (47)
can be satisfied with p∗ = max{ψ−11 (tk p¯i), ψ−12 (0)}.
We need to consider the following two cases:
Case 1: when ψ−12 (0) ≥ ψ−11 (tk p¯i), p∗ = ψ−12 (0), that is (ts +
tk)Fpi(p∗) − (ts + tk)Fpi(p∗)2 − tk = 0, which is equivalent to
1 − tk
te (1−Fpi (p)) = 1 −
ts−tk ( 1Fpi (p∗)−1)
te
. Thus the condition (47)
holds in case 1.
Case 2: when ψ−11 (tk p¯i) ≥ ψ−12 (0), p∗ = ψ−11 (tk p¯i). According
to (46), we know that ψ2(p) is monotone decreasing with p.
Thus ψ2(ψ−11 (tk p¯i)) < ψ2(ψ−12 (0)) = 0, which is equivalent to
1 − tk
te (1−Fpi (p)) < 1 −
ts−tk ( 1Fpi (p∗)−1)
te
. Therefore, the condition
(47) also holds in case 2.
Then we will consider when
1 − tk
te(1 − Fpi(p)) ≥ 1 −
ts − tk( 1Fpi (p∗) − 1)
te
(47)
q∗ = 1 − tk
te (1−Fpi (p))
Then we substitute q in (P1) with q∗, (P1) becomes
(P1”) min G2(p) = (1 − tkte(1 − Fpi(p)) )te p¯i +
tk
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx
Fpi(p)(1 − Fpi(p))
(48)
subject to 1 − tk
te(1 − Fpi(p)) ≥ 1 −
ts − tk( 1Fpi (p∗) − 1)
te
(49)
1 − tk
te(1 − Fpi(p)) ≤
ts
te
(50)
pi ≤ p ≤ p¯i (51)
0 ≤ 1 − tk
te(1 − Fpi(p)) ≤ 1 (52)
Next, we take the first derivative of the objective function
in (P1”),
∂G2(p)
∂p
=
fpi(p)tk[−p¯iFpi(p)2 + pFpi(p)(1 − Fpi(p)) − (1 − 2Fpi(p))
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx]
Fpi(p)2(1 − Fpi(p))2
(53)
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Suppose g2(p) = −p¯iFpi(p)2 + pFpi(p)(1 − Fpi(p)) − (1 −
2Fpi(p))
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx, Now, we will prove g2(p) ≤ 0
pFpi(p)(1 − Fpi(p)) + (2Fpi(p) − 1)
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx
=Fpi(p)[p(1 − Fpi(p)) + (2Fpi(p) − 1)
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx
Fpi(p) ]
≤Fpi(p)[p¯i(1 − Fpi(p)) + p¯i(2Fpi − 1)]
=p¯iFpi(p)2
(54)
Thus, g2(p) = pFpi(p)(1−Fpi(p))+(2Fpi(p)−1)
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx−
p¯iFpi(p)2 ≤ 0 Then we can get ∂G2(p)∂p ≤ 0, thus G2(p)
decreases monotonically with p, and the optimal solution is
the largest possible p in its feasible set.
Because 1 − ts−tk (
1
Fpi (p∗)−1)
te
≥ 1 − tste > 0. Thus, if we can
meet constraint (49), constraint (52) will be met.
As we analyzed in the last part, constraint (49) is equivalent
to
ψ2(p) = (ts + tk)Fpi(p) − (ts + tk)Fpi(p)2 − tk ≤ 0 (55)
which is monotone decreasing with p. Thus the largest feasible
solution will be obtained when ψ2(p) = 0. Therefore, the
optimal solution p∗ = ψ−12 (0).
In summary,
• When 1 − tk
te (1−Fpi (p)) ≤ 1 −
ts−tk ( 1Fpi (p∗)−1)
te
,
p∗ = max{ψ−11 (tk p¯i), ψ−12 (0)}, q∗ = 1 −
ts−tk ( 1Fpi (p∗)−1)
te
;
• When 1 − tk
te (1−Fpi (p)) ≥ 1 −
ts−tk ( 1Fpi (p∗)−1)
te
,
p∗ = ψ−12 (0), q∗ = 1 − tkte (1−Fpi (p)) = 1 −
ts−tk ( 1Fpi (p∗)−1)
te
We combine the above two cases: p∗ =
max{ψ−11 (tk p¯i), ψ−12 (0)}, q∗ = 1 −
ts−tk ( 1Fpi (p∗)−1)
te
. Thus
Proposition 1 is proved.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Recalling (34) in Proposition 1, we know that Φ1(p, q)
increases monotonically with q, the user can minimize his ex-
pected total cost by choosing the smallest possible q in the fea-
sible set. That is, q∗ = max{1− tk
te (1−Fpi (p)), 1−
ts−tk ( 1Fpi (p∗)−1)
te
, 0}.
When
1 − tk
te(1 − Fpi(p)) ≤ 0 (56)
and
1 −
ts − tk( 1Fpi (p∗) − 1)
te
≤ 0 (57)
q∗ = 0
When q = 0, the objective function of (P1) becomes
G(p) =
te
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx
Fpi(p)
Then we take the first derivative of G(p) and get
∂G(p)
∂p
= te fpi(p)(
p −
∫ p
pi
x fpi (x)dx
Fpi (p)
Fpi(p) ) ≥ 0,
which means the G(p) monotonic increasing with p. Min-
imizing G(p) is equivalent to finding the minimum p in
its feasible set. Suppose ts − te ≥ tk and te ≥ 2tk , then
p∗ = max{F−1pi (1 − tkte ), F−1pi (
tk
ts−te+tk ), pi} = F−1pi (1 −
tk
te
), which
is equivalent to
1 − tk
te(1 − Fpi(p)) = 0,
thus condition (56) is satisfied.
Next we will check whether condition (57) will be satisfied.
1 −
ts − tk( 1Fpi (p∗) − 1)
te
≤ 1 − te + tk
te
+
tk
te
( tk
te
− 1)
=
tk(2tk − te)
te(te − tk)
≤ 0
thus condition (57) is also satisfied. This proves the result
as in the statement of Proposition 2.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF CLAIM 2
Recall that with bid price p and deadline ts , Fpi(p) denotes
the probability that the bid price p ≥ pi(t), the spot price, the
job’s expected running time on spot instance is tsFpi(p). In
order to guarantee the job can be finished before deadline,
tsFpi(p∗) ≥ (1 − q∗)te,
tsFpi(p∗) ≥ (1 − q∗)te
⇐⇒ Fpi(p∗) ≥ (1 − q∗) tets
⇐⇒ Fpi(p∗) ≥ 1 − q∗
⇐⇒ Fpi(p∗) ≥ 12 .
(58)
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
When te2 < ts < te, we take the first-order derivative of
G(p, q) over q and get
∂Φ3(p, q)
∂q
= te(p¯i − 11 − trtk (1 − Fpi(p))
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx
Fpi(p) )
≥ te(p¯i −
2
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx
Fpi(p) )
(59)
Suppose g(p) = p¯i − 2
∫ p
pi
x fpi (x)dx
Fpi (p) , and take the first-order of
derivative of g(p), we get
∂g(p)
∂p
= −2 fpi(p)
Fpi(p)2 (pFpi(p) −
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx) ≤ 0
thus g(p) monotonically decrease with p. The minimum value
of g(p) is gmin(p) = g(p¯i) = p¯i−
2
∫ p¯i
pi
x fpi (x)dx
Fpi (p) ≥ 0. Then we can
get
∂Φ3(p, q)
∂q
≥ 0. (60)
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Therefore, Φ3(p, q) monotonically increases with q. Mini-
mizing Φ3(p, q) is equivalent to finding the minimum q in its
feasible set, that is,
q∗ = max{1 −
tsFpi(p)(1 − trtk (1 − Fpi(p)))
te
, 0}
Because
1 −
tsFpi(p)(1 − trtk (1 − Fpi(p)))
te
≥ 1 − ts
te
≥ 0, (61)
q∗ = 1 −
tsFpi(p)(1 − trtk (1 − Fpi(p)))
te
(62)
Then substitute q using q∗ in (P3), we will get a new
optimization problem (P3’)
(P3’) min G(p) = te p¯i − tsFpi(p)p¯i[1 − trtk (1 − Fpi(p))]
+ ts
∫ p
pi
fpi(x)dx
(63)
s.t. (1 −
tr + tsFpi(p)(1 − trtk (1 − Fpi(p)))
te
)te ≤ ts
(64)
tr <
tk
2(1 − Fpi(p)) (65)
pi ≤ p ≤ p¯i (66)
1 −
tsFpi(p)(1 − trtk (1 − Fpi(p)))
te
≥ 0 (67)
Take the first-order derivative of G(p), we have
∂G(p)
∂p
= (p − p¯i)ts fpi(p) + tr tstk p¯i fpi(p)(1 − 2Fpi(p)) < 0,
so G(p) monotonic decreasing with p. Thus, the optimal
solution is p∗ = p¯i. In addition, the constraints (64) and (67)
are satisfied at optimality.
Substitute p with p∗ = p¯i in (62), we will get q∗ = 1− tste ≥ 0.
This proves the result given in the statement of Proposition 3.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
From (60) we know that Φ3(p, q) monotonically increases
with q.
q∗ = max{1 −
tsFpi(p)(1 − trtk (1 − Fpi(p)))
te
, 0}
When
1 −
tsFpi(p)(1 − trtk (1 − Fpi(p)))
te
≤ 0, (68)
q∗ = 0,
then optimization problem (P3) will become
(P3”) min Φ(p) = te
1 − trtk (1 − Fpi(p))
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx
Fpi(p)
(69)
subject to
te
1 − trtk (1 − Fpi(p))
1
Fpi(p) ≤ ts (70)
pi ≤ p ≤ p¯i (71)
By taking the first derivative of Φ(p) in (P3”), we will have
∂Φ(p)
∂p
=
(te) fpi(p)(1 − trtk + 2
tr
tk
Fpi(p))
h(p)2 g(p)
where
g(p) = −
∫ p
pi
x fpi(x)dx + p
(1 − trtk )Fpi(p) +
tr
tk
(Fpi(p))2
1 − trtk + 2
tr
tk
Fpi(p)
and
h(p) = (1 − tr
tk
)Fpi(p) + trtk (Fpi(p))
2
Because
(te ) fpi (p)(1− trtk +2
tr
tk
Fpi (p))
h(p)2 > 0, in order to show the
positivity of Φ(p), we take the first derivative of g(p) and
then we have
∂g(p)
∂p
=
1 − trtk + 2
tr
tk
(Fpi(p) − p fpi(p))
(1 − trtk + 2
tr
tk
Fpi(p))2
h(p)
Because Fpi(p) is concave and Fpi(p) − p fpi(p) ≥ 0, we have
∂g(p)
∂p ≥ 0. Thus, g(p) monotonically increases with p. By the
fact that g(pi) = 0, then g(p) ≥ 0 and ∂Φ(p)∂p ≥ 0, i.e., Φ(p)
increases monotonically with p.
In order to minimize the total cost, we just need to choose
the lowest feasible bid price. Constraint (70) in (P3”) is
equivalent to
g(p) = tr
tk
Fpi(p)2 + (1 − trtk )Fpi(p) ≥
te
ts
. (72)
The axis of symmetry of g(Fpi(p)) is Fpi(p) = − tk−tr2tr <
0, thus g(Fpi(p)) monotonically increases with Fpi(p) on the
condition that 0 ≤ Fpi(p) ≤ 1 and g(p) monotonically increases
with p on the condition that pi ≤ p ≤ p¯i. So the minimum value
to satisfy constraint (70) is g(p∗) = tets . Because 0 ≤
te
ts
≤
1, the maximum and minimum value of g(p) is gmax(p) =
g(p¯i) = 1 and gmin(p) = g(pi) = 0 respectively. Therefore,
constraint (71) is satisfied. g(p∗) = tets is equivalent to 1 −
tsFpi (p∗)(1− trtk (1−Fpi (p
∗)))
te
= 0, thus the condition (68) is satisfied.
This proves the result as in the statement of Proposition 4.
18
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF LEMMA 8
Recall that when ts < te ≤ 2ts , Fpi(p∗) ≥ 12 . The difference
optimal portions of job to run on on-demand instance in
Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 is
1 −
ts − tk( 1Fpi (p∗) − 1)
te
− (1 − ts
te
)
=
tk
te
( 1
Fpi(p∗) − 1)
≤ tk
te
(73)
Note the last step is because Fpi(p∗) ≥ 12 .
